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Macroeconomic Implications of
Shifts in the Relative Demand
for Skills
Olivier Blanchard*
y assignment for this conference on U.S.
wage trends was, as an outsider, to draw
the macroeconomic implications of wid-
ening wage inequality. I shall do so in
six points.
THE RACE BETWEEN RELATIVE DEMAND
AND RELATIVE SUPPLY
The ﬁrst point is not speciﬁcally about macroeconomic
implications. It emerges from my reading of the body of
research. What has happened is usually described as having
come from an increase in relative demand for skills. It is in
fact better described as a race, over the last twenty years,
between increases in relative demand for skills and
increases in relative supply. In the 1970s, relative supply
won; in the 1980s, relative demand won. But in both
decades, the race has been fast on both sides.
M
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To make the point more precisely, let me rely on
the work of Larry Katz and Kevin Murphy. In Katz and
Murphy (1992), they aggregate labor in two groups, high
school (H) and college (C), and estimate the following rela-
tive demand relation, in inverse form, using data from
1963 to 1987:
(1.1)
The relative wage depends on the relative supply of C and
H—the coefﬁcient implies a fairly high elasticity between
the two,  = 1/.709 = 1.4—and a time trend, which cap-
tures the shift in relative demand. The coefﬁcient on time
is the same throughout: contrary to common perceptions,
Katz and Murphy ﬁnd little evidence that the relative
demand shift is accelerating.
Now do the following computation. Suppose
that there had been no change in relative supply, so that
log(C/H) had remained constant. Then over those twenty-
four years, the relative wage of college workers would have
increased by .033 times (24) = 79 percent! The actual
WC WH ¤ ( ) 0.709 C H ¤ log – =
constant .033 time + +
s
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increase was only 10 percent. The difference is accounted
for by the increase in relative supply. Table 1 builds on
Katz and Murphy to show the contribution of shifts in
demand and supply to the evolution of the wage.
What is striking is how large the numbers in the
ﬁrst two lines of the table are, how large the shifts in rela-
tive demand and supply have consistently been. If one is an
optimist, one can read this table as suggesting that it
would not take much change in either the rate of change of
supply or demand to reestablish balance. If one is a pessi-
mist, one can read it as suggesting that things could easily
get much worse, that wage inequality may easily deterio-
rate faster. But in any case, the message of the table—that
both demand and supply have changed rapidly—strikes
me as important.
UNEMPLOYMENT
Let me now turn to macro implications. The main macro
implication of the increase in net relative demand for skills
is likely to be higher aggregate unemployment, or more
generally, nonemployment.
The reason is obvious. The labor supply of the
unskilled is much more elastic than that of the skilled
workers. Thus, the increase in the wage of skilled workers
does not increase their labor supply very much, if at all.
But the decrease in the wage of unskilled workers can lead
to a large decrease in their labor supply.
How large has the effect been so far? The question
has been looked at carefully by Chinhui Juhn, Kevin Mur-
phy, and Robert Topel in Juhn et al. (1991). Estimating
labor supply elasticities of workers with different levels of
wages, they found that they could explain all of the
increase in nonemployment of 2.3 percent for prime age
males from the early 1970s to the late 1980s (of which 0.7
percent took the form of higher unemployment).
As for what happens in the future, the elasticities
at the low end of the wage scale are critical. The elasticities
estimated at the low end of the wage scale by Juhn et al.
are large by the standards of the labor literature, on the
order of .3. These may, however, be quite optimistic. Labor
supply depends not only on the real wage, but on the real
wage relative to what is provided by the safety net. When
the real wage gets close to the safety net, attachment to
work is likely to be weak, the elasticity of labor supply
likely to be large. My sense is that in the United States at
this point, minimum wage or no minimum wage, labor
supply is likely to be very elastic at $4 to $5 an hour.
What does this imply? One can use the estimates
from Katz and Murphy to do a rough computation.
Assume that relative demand is given by (1.1). Now
assume that the elasticity of high school labor is given by:
(2.1)
where  is the number of H workers and  is the elastic-
ity with respect to the relative wage. Assume that the labor
supply of C workers is inelastic, so that all C workers are
employed, and . Finally assume that the number of
H workers relative to C workers continues to decrease at
the same rate as in the last eight years, so that:
(2.2)
Then a few simple steps give:
(2.3)
If, for example, the elasticity of supply of H workers is
equal to 1—rather than the .3 number used by Juhn et
al.—then the annual decrease in the employment rate of H
workers is equal to 0.9 percent. Since H workers account
for roughly 60 percent of the labor force, this represents a
decrease in the employment rate of about 0.5 percent a
year, a large number indeed. I believe the basic message of
this computation to be right. At the current wages, the
labor elasticity of low-skill workers may be quite high. If
there is no change in demand and supply trends and no
change in policy, we could well see a large decrease in
employment rates in the future.
H/H ( ) a WH W C ¤ ( ) , log = log
H a
C C =
D H C ¤ ( ) -2.4 percent. =






RELATIVE DEMAND AND SUPPLY SHIFTS
1963-71 1971-79 1979-87
Change in (WC/WH)
Due to increase in demand (estimated) 26.4 26.4 26.4
Due to increase in supply (estimated) -22.2 -28.9 -18.0
Net (estimated) 4.2 -2.5 8.4
Net (actual) 7.7 -10.4 12.850 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995
THE UNITED STATES VERSUS EUROPE
The effects of the relative demand shift on nonemployment
will obviously be worse if there is a binding minimum
wage. But in the United States, the wage at which labor
supply becomes extremely elastic cannot be very far from
the minimum wage. So, it is not clear that this makes a
large macro difference.
The same is not true of Europe, where the mini-
mum wage is a substantially higher percentage of the
median wage. But here I want to debunk a theme that is
popular in the press and has been endorsed by Paul Krug-
man (1994). The theme is that the difference between
unemployment rates in Europe and the United States
comes from different responses to a similar relative demand
shift. The United States, the argument goes, has chosen
larger wage inequality, avoiding most of the increase in
unemployment. Europe instead has limited the increase in
wage dispersion, thereby pricing a large number of workers
out of the market; the result has been high unemployment.
It is not hard to see why this idea might be popu-
lar. The increase in unemployment in Europe has indeed
been much larger among the low-skill than among the
high-skill workers. Table 2 below, borrowed from Stephen
Nickell and Brian Bell (1994, Table 2), shows the basic
evolution of unemployment rates in four European coun-
tries.
So why doubt the Krugman explanation? I have
no doubt that a higher relative minimum wage, combined
with the shift of relative demand, has led to more unem-
ployment of the unskilled in Europe. Even that proposi-
tion, however, is surprisingly hard to establish from a look
at the cross section of European experiences.
But the change in the distribution of unemploy-
ment rates in Table 2 is also exactly what we would expect
to happen in response to a shift in aggregate rather than
relative demand for labor. It is well understood that in
response to a neutral adverse shift in demand, various
effects—“ladder” effects, “ranking” effects, the labor sup-
ply elasticities we discussed earlier—lead the unemploy-
ment rate of low-skill workers to increase much more than
the unemployment rate for high-skill workers. Back-of-
the-envelope computations I have done for a few countries
suggest that the evolution of the distribution of rates is
roughly what one would expect had the only shock been an
aggregate shock and had the elasticities of skill-speciﬁc
unemployment rates remained the same as in the past. A
more careful computation by Nickell and Bell leads them
to conclude that only about one-ﬁfth of the increase in
unemployment in the United Kingdom is due to the rela-
tive demand shift.
Thus, there is a trade-off between unemployment
and wage dispersion. But it is not the one shown by a sim-
ple comparison of the United States and Europe.
THE SHAPE AND SIZE OF TRANSFERS
If one believes—either on income distribution grounds or
on grounds of externalities—that something should be
done to avoid either the increase in wage dispersion or the
increase in unemployment rates for the unskilled, what
measures should one advocate?
No economist is likely to be in favor of a substan-
tial increase in the minimum wage as a solution to the shift
in relative demand. Most proposals on this and the other
side of the Atlantic have focused on employment subsidies
for the unskilled. Edmond Malinvaud and Jacques Dreze
have argued for the elimination of payroll taxes for low-
wage workers. Phelps (1994) has argued for the introduc-
tion of a graduated subsidy, phased out at pre-subsidy
hourly wages of $10.
How large might these subsidies be? This clearly
Note:  Educational levels are deﬁned differently in each country. In France, high
ed=two years of university or more; low ed=primary school certiﬁcate or less. In
Germany, high ed=professional, technical and related, and administrative work-
ers; low ed=production and related workers, transport equipment operators, and
laborers. In the United Kingdom, high ed=passed A levels or more; low ed=no
qualiﬁcations. In Spain, high ed=university; low ed=primary education or less.
Table 2
EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
For High- and Low-Education Workers in Four European Countries
1979-82 1993 1979-82 1991
France Overall 5.2 9.4 U.K. Overall 7.7 10.0
High ed 2.1 5.9 High ed 3.9 5.7
Low ed 6.5 13.6 Low ed 12.2 17.4
1979-82 1991 1979-82 1993
Germany Overall 3.8 5.4 Spain Overall 11.7 17.9
High ed 1.6 2.4 High ed 7.9 10.7
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depends on the goal, both in terms of wage inequality and
of unemployment rates. A simple computation, once again
based on the Katz and Murphy relation above, is instruc-
tive.
Suppose we wanted to reestablish the wage differ-
ential between H and C workers at its level of about ten
years ago. Data in Table 1 suggest that this would require
an increase of about 15 percent in the wages of H workers.
How large a subsidy it would require depends in turn on
the elasticities of demand and supply. Take the elasticity of
demand from the Katz and Murphy equation earlier.
Assume that the supply of C workers is inelastic. Assume
that the supply of H workers is a function of the wage dif-
ferential, with elasticity .2—a number that appears
roughly consistent with the average of the Juhn et al. esti-
mates over the relevant range of wages. Then, the subsidy
to ﬁrms should be equal to 15 percent (1 + .2  x .7) = 17
percent.
How large a subsidy does this represent in terms
of the wage bill? From Bound and Johnson, we know that
H workers account for roughly 60 percent of employment.
Their wage is about 65 percent of the wage of C workers.
Thus, a subsidy equal to 15 percent of their wage implies
an increase in the wage bill of (.6 x .65 x 1.17 + .4 x 1)/(.6
x .65 + .4 x 1) -1 = 8.3 percent of the wage bill, or about 4
to 5 percent of GDP.
This is a very large sum indeed. But it is not very
different from other estimates. James Heckman has asked a
closely related question: How much would have to be
spent on training to go back to the 1979 differential? He
estimates the cost to be about $160 billion on an annual
basis, about 3 percent of GDP. Ned Phelps estimates the
cost of his scheme (under the assumption of zero labor sup-
ply elasticity) to be around $180 billion. And it only takes
care of the widening to date. Under the assumption that
the shifts are the same in the future, the cost of maintain-
ing the wage differential increases at a rate of about 0.4/0.5
percent of GDP per year.
Is it likely that anything like this will be put in
place? The answer must be no. The political mood is surely
not propitious to the creation of new large transfer pro-
grams. The main insight from the theory of political econ-
omy here is that the earlier such a system is put in place,
the more likely it is to have political support. The earlier it
is put in place, the more it looks like a social insurance pro-
gram, the less like a transfer program. But it may already
be too late: the winners and the losers are already fairly
well identiﬁed.
SUPPLY RESPONSES
The increase in net relative demand for skills leads to an
increase in the returns to acquiring those skills. Can we
expect the effect to be strong enough that increases in rela-
tive supply will catch up again with increases in relative
demand, leading to little or no further wage dispersion?
The answer from current forecasts, as explained in
the paper by Frank Levy for this conference, is indeed for
some supply response. The longer run outcome depends on
two factors. On the one hand, the return to education has
increased; this should certainly lead to a positive supply
response. On the other hand, the income of the currently
unskilled has decreased. If credit markets are imperfect, so
that borrowing against future earnings is difﬁcult, or if pri-
mary and secondary education are largely locally ﬁnanced,
this makes it harder for the unskilled, or their children, to
acquire education.
Which effect dominates has implications that go
far beyond the sign of the supply response: if the sign is
negative, wage and skill inequality are likely to be magni-
ﬁed over time. The issues here have been clariﬁed in partic-
ular by the work of Roland Benabou (1992). But as far as I
know, there is little evidence on the relative strengths of
the effects. Whether an increase in wage inequality is
likely to lead to more or less education in the United States
today is still to be empirically settled.
Even if we do not have the answer, the analysis
still has a clear implication. Reducing credit market
imperfections to allow people to borrow against future
earnings is more desirable than before. There are good the-
oretical reasons to believe that the government can play a
role here, and some good empirical reasons to believe that
it can play more of a role than it has played in the past.
Moreover, if a transfer program is put in place to reduce
wage dispersion, there is an additional argument for avoid-52 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995
ing the distortion between unskilled work and education,
and thus for subsidizing the college education of poor students.
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
I see two interesting issues about technological progress in
this context.  The ﬁrst is whether, assuming that a good
part of the shift in relative demand has come from skill-
biased technological progress, this bias will continue in the
future. One can think of scenarios in which the future is
different from the past. In the paper I mentioned earlier,
Paul Krugman indicates that the next step for computers
may be to replace skilled workers. He mentions lawyers
and accountants. Or, computers may become so user-
friendly that workers no longer require computer skills to
operate them. The problem here is that, as far as I know,
these speculations fairly summarize the state of our knowl-
edge: in short, we do not know.
A slightly more solid reason for believing that the
future will be different from the past is based on the fact
that technological progress is not exogenous. The shift in
relative wages in the last decade has increased the return to
developing techniques of production that use relatively
more unskilled workers. Here again, we do not know
much, if anything. But at least the argument relies on a
basic economic mechanism, a response to relative prices.
The second issue of interest is whether the increase
in the relative supply of skilled workers—if it indeed hap-
pens—will allow ﬁrms to adopt new and more sophisti-
cated technologies faster and more effectively, leading
them to sustain higher productivity growth. If this were
the case, I could end on a rather optimistic note. I could
argue that skill-biased technological change may not only
lead to an increase in the education of the U.S. labor force,
but may also hold the key to higher technological growth
in the future.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence to sustain
this claim. In this case, we actually have the beginning of
an answer from a recent paper by James Kahn and Jon-Soo
Lim (1994). Kahn and Lim look at the relation between
multifactor productivity (tfp) growth and the share of
skilled labor, measured as the proportion of workers with
twelve years or more of education. At ﬁrst glance, their
results look quite impressive. Their results imply the fol-
lowing relation across sectors:
(6.1)
where  is the share of skilled labor. The average share is
0.62, so that average tfp growth is .75 percent per year. If
the results are seen as implying a causal relation between
the share and productivity growth—rather than common
factors, or omitted variables—they are quite impressive.
They imply, for example, that if the share of skilled labor
in the United States was increased from 0.62 to 0.70, tfp
growth would increase to 1.65 percent. Unfortunately,
however, the results are largely driven by two sectors,
tobacco and petroleum, which have low shares of skilled
labor and low productivity. Both sectors suffer from notori-
ous measurement problems. Thus, one cannot see the evi-
dence as very conclusive.
SUMMARY
What are the macro implications of the increase in the rel-
ative demand for skills? Here are the conclusions of a neo-
phyte:
 If the trend increase in the net relative demand for
skills continues, it has the potential to lead to substantially
higher overall unemployment.
If the trend continues, the size of the transfers
needed to offset the increase in wage inequality is much
too large to be politically feasible. Subsidies such as cuts in
payroll taxes for the unskilled are desirable but will have
limited effects.
A positive supply response sufﬁcient to eventually
offset the trend in demand cannot be taken for granted.
Measures avoiding local ﬁnance effects of increased income
inequality on primary and secondary education and allow-
ing for easier borrowing by poor students for higher educa-
tion seem essential.
tfp growth -6.22% 11.25% b, + =
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